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JURISDICTION 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction over "orders, judgments, and decrees of any 
court of record over which the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate 
jurisdiction," including interlocutory appeals of such orders. Utah Code § 78-2-2(3)(j). 
This Court granted the Petition for Permission to Appeal from Interlocutory Order filed 
by Plaintiffs (collectively referred to herein as "Otter Creek") on January 4, 2007. 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Numerous issues about the continuing diversion and use of water by Defendant 
New Escalante Irrigation Company ("New Escalante") for over 100 years were raised by 
the parties before the trial court, some of which remain for resolution at trial. However, 
the parties have agreed that an immediate resolution of a single, pivotal legal issue will 
materially advance the conclusion of this matter. That issue is whether the trial court 
erred in determining that New Escalante's long-time diversion of water, continuing after 
the entry of the 1936 Decree Adjudicating the Sevier River System, Honorable LeRoy H. 
Cox, Millard County Case No. 843 (the "Cox Decree"), could be the basis of a right 
based in adverse possession notwithstanding a 1939 statute prohibiting new claims for the 
acquisition of water rights by adverse possession thereafter. TR 910-918. 
DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS 
New Escalante acknowledges the lengthy compilation of statutes in Otter Creek's 
April 19, 2007 Brief on Appeal ("Opening Brief) but does not agree that most of such 
authorities bear on the issue on appeal. Neither does New Escalante agree with the 
arguments advanced by Otter Creek in the "Relevance" comments following the statutory 
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language quoted at pages 2 through 10 of the Opening Brief New Escalante respectfully 
submits that the following statutes are those likely to be determinative of this appeal: 
R.S. 1933 § 100-3-1 (as effective in 1936). Only Manner of Acquiring Water Rights. 
Rights to the use of unappropriated public waters in this state may be acquired 
only as provided in this title. No appropriation of water may be made and no 
rights to the use thereof initiated and no notice of intent to appropriate shall be 
recognized except application for such appropriation first be made to the state 
engineer in the manner hereinafter provided, and not otherwise. ... (emphasis 
added). 
R.S. 1933 § 100-3-1 (as amended in 1939). Appropriation-Manner of Acquiring 
Water Rights. 
Rights to the use of the unappropriated public waters in this state may be acquired 
only as provided in this title. No appropriation of water may be made and no 
rights to the use thereof initiated and no notice of intent to appropriate shall be 
recognized except application for such appropriation first be made to the state 
engineer in the manner hereinafter provided, and not otherwise .... No right to the 
use of water either appropriated or unappropriated can be acquired by adverse use 
or adverse possession. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The first non-Native Americans settled in the Escalante, Utah area in 1875. 
Shortly thereafter, the settlers began construction of a ditch located in Iron Springs Draw 
near the summit of Griffin Top, in the Boulder Mountains, just north of the divide 
between the drainages of the Escalante and Sevier Rivers. This ditch intercepted the 
snow melt in a limited area of the Sevier drainage and conveyed it to the Escalante side 
of the divide, where it joined the natural flows and provided crucial late-season irrigation 
flows to the farmers in the extremely arid Escalante area. The uncontroverted evidence 
provided to the trial court in connection with serial motions or summary judgment 
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demonstrates that New Escalante and its predecessors have continuously diverted and 
used the waters of Iron Springs Draw by diversion and beneficial use for over 100 years, 
continuing to the present time. 
General stream adjudication proceedings were commenced in the then-Fifth 
District Court in Millard County in about 1920 that ultimately led to the entry of the Cox 
Decree on November 30, 1936. New Escalante argued below, and has preserved for 
future appeal if necessary, its claims that it acquired diligence rights to the waters 
intercepted in Iron Springs Draw by beneficial use before 1903, that it continuously 
diverted those waters during the 16-year pendency of the Sevier River adjudication, and 
that the Iron Springs Draw waters diverted by New Escalante were thus not among those 
stream flows adjudicated by Judge Cox. 
New Escalante did not receive actual notice of the pendency of the Sevier River 
adjudication and argued that it was sufficiently remote that publication was ineffective to 
put it on notice of an obligation to assert a claim to the water before Judge Cox. In point 
of fact, there was no mention of either New Escalante or Iron Springs Draw in the Cox 
Decree. In the terms of a representative of the Attorney General's office made in a 
related proceeding, the Iron Springs Draw waters were not adjudicated by the Cox Decree 
and were "open game." Nevertheless, the trial court determined that New Escalante was 
required to assert its claim to the water in the Sevier River adjudication for review by 
Judge Cox. Since New Escalante failed to do so, according to the trial court, its 
diligence claim to those waters was cut off by the Cox Decree. 
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This interlocutory appeal picks up with the determination of the trial court that, 
since New Escalante's claim to the Iron Springs waters was cut off by the Cox Decree, 
New Escalante's continuing use of those waters was adverse to Otter Creek beginning on 
December 1, 1936, the day after entry of the Cox Decree and continuing to the present 
time. The trial court noted that opinions of this Court confirm that waters were 
susceptible to acquisition by adverse possession in Utah prior to a 1939 amendment to the 
water appropriation statute that prohibited adverse possession claims from arising 
thereafter. That amendment had no language indicating that the legislature intended it to 
operate retroactively or to cut off rights that were then ripening. Accordingly, the trial 
court granted in part New Escalante's Motion for Summary Judgment, finding "that the 
Defendant's right initiated in December 1936 [immediately following the Cox Decree] 
may still ripen into a full adverse possession claim, provided the Defendant's use meets 
the necessary elements." Memorandum Decision on Motions for Summary Judgment 
("Mem. Dec. I") at p. 13, TR 916. Accordingly, the trial court determined that New 
Escalante would be entitled to present evidence on the elements of adverse possession 
based on use after December 1, 1936 at trial. 
Otter Creek requested leave to appeal the trial court's decision on adverse 
possession because that legal issue will likely determine the outcome of this case. New 
Escalante believes that the trial court erroneously determined that the Cox Decree 
deprived it of its diligence rights and has preserved that issue. Nevertheless, New 
Escalante supported Otter Creek's petition for interlocutory appeal because, if the trial 
court is correct on the issue of adverse possession, the uncontroverted evidence of New 
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Escalante's continuous use of the Iron Springs water after 1936 will result in judgment in 
favor of New Escalante and will obviate the need to review the trial court's other rulings. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Otter Creek failed to set forth a Statement of Facts in its Opening Brief as required 
by Rule 24 (a)(7). New Escalante believes that determination of the legal issue presented 
in this appeal requires an understanding of the factual context in which that issue arises 
and therefore offers the following summary of the relevant facts that were presented to 
and addressed by the trial court. These facts were largely set forth in affidavits filed in 
connection the motions for summary judgment. The primary focus of these motions was 
the establishment of New Escalante's diligence claim based on pre-1903 use, not on the 
1930s and '40s. The supporting affidavits complied with the standards set forth in 
Eskelson v. Town of Perry, 819 P.2d 770 (Utah 1991). More pertinently, Otter Creek 
offered no affidavits or other evidence to challenge the facts submitted by New Escalante. 
1. New Escalante has its principal place of business in the Town of Escalante, 
Garfield County, State of Utah, and was incorporated on June 2, 1915 for purposes of 
distributing water to its shareholders for the irrigation of their farmlands in the Escalante 
valley. New Escalante's Articles of Agreement ('Articles of Agreement"), attached as 
Exhibit 2 to New Escalante's Memo In Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
("Memo in Support"), TR 309, 355-358. 
2. New Escalante was a successor-in-interest to a prior entity formed in the 
year of 1890 for the purpose of providing irrigation and watering services to the early 
viii 
settlers in the Escalante region. Affidavit ofMelAlvey ("Alvey Affidavit"), attached as 
Exhibit 3 to Memo in Support, TR 359-364. 
3. At some time prior to 1890, the members of New Escalante constructed a 
ditch to capture, lawfully divert and beneficially use, the water from an area known as 
Iron Springs. Alvey Affidavit, fflf 2-8; TR 359-363. See also Mem. Dec. I, at p. 2, TR 
458. (A copy of Mem. Dec. / i s attached hereto as Appendix 1.) The water originates in 
the snowpack in the Boulder or Escalante Mountains, Northeast of Griffm Top, a 
mountain peak located approximately 20 miles northwest of the town of Escalante, and 
near the top of the North Creek drainage. Id. 
4. This water source has provided an essential source of supplemental storage 
water for New Escalante for over 100 years. Alvey Affidavit, fflf 2-8; TR 359-363. See 
also Mem. Dec. I at p. 2, TR 458. 
5. New Escalante established a date of appropriation priority in approximately 
1875, when work first commenced on the construction of the ditch required to divert the 
water from Iron Springs Draw. Accordingly, Defendant's diligence right has a priority of 
1875. Alvey Affidavit, ^f 2-8, TR 359-363; New Escalante's Diligence Claim attached 
as Exhibit 4 to Memo in Support, TR 310-311, 365-370.] 
1
 As noted, the validity of New Escalante's diligence rights is not before the Court at this 
time. New Escalante has argued below, and has preserved for appeal if necessary, that it 
has claim to the Iron Springs waters based on diligence rights. Diligence rights are rights 
acquired by diverting water from its natural water course and applying the water to a 
beneficial use prior to the adoption of the permit statute on March 12, 1903, the effective 
date of the statute requiring the filing of applications to appropriate water in Utah. 
Yardley v. Swapp, 364 P.2d 4 (Utah 1961). 
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6. The construction of the ditch, and the continued uninterrupted beneficial 
use of the water to the Escalante valley, is well remembered and documented amongst the 
early settlers of the Escalante Region. Mem. Dec. /, at pp. 2-6, TR 459-462. The Alvey 
Affidavit declares that his family arrived in the Escalante region in 1890, and that he 
personally worked to reinforce the ditch as early as 1916, when he was eight years old, 
and again in 1926. Alvey Affidavit, at U 5, TR 460-461. Mr. Alvey was acquainted with 
the New Escalante Irrigation Company nearly his entire life, serving as the President of 
the Company for 25 years, and as a Board Member for 43 years, see Alvey Affidavit, at 
11 1, TR 459-460. Mr. Alvey passed away, however, on November 8, 2003. See also 
Affidavit ofNeal Liston, TR 371 (Liston recalls firsthand knowledge of repairing ditch as 
a young boy in early 1900s). 
7. Based on this historic use, New Escalante has, for a period of more than 
seven years, enjoyed continuous, uninterrupted, hostile, open, notorious and adverse 
beneficial use of the Iron Springs area. Alvey Affidavit, H 7, TR 463. 
8. Otter Creek has always been on constructive notice of the presence of the 
Ditch and the maintenance activities in the Iron Springs area, because many of its owners 
held grazing allotments and rights at or around the site and were regularly in the area with 
their herds. Id. 
9. Since the 1930s, maintenance on the Iron Springs ditch has been open and 
notoriously performed with mechanized equipment. Id. New Escalante regularly used 
and employed backhoes and caterpillar tractors to reinforce and rebuild the ditch to 
x 
prevent breach. Id. Such maintenance is required by Section 73-1-8 of the Utah Code 
and has been continuous until the present day. Id. 
10. This action was filed in July 2001 by Otter Creek, seeking declaratory, 
injunctive and monetary relief. 
11. In or about November 2003, New Escalante and Otter Creek filed cross 
motions for summary judgment. 
12. The trial court decided the parties' motions in Mem. Dec. Ion or about 
June 17, 2005, after visiting Iron Springs Draw with representatives of the parties. In that 
decision, the trial court denied both parties' summary judgment motions but encouraged 
the parties to renew their motions on a more developed factual record. Mem. Dec. I, at 
12, TR 468. Otter Creek initially moved for summary judgment, in part, claiming that 
that the Cox Decree extinguished any diligence or adverse use rights possessed by New 
Escalante in the Iron Springs area. The Cox Decree adjudicated certain water rights in 
the Sevier River Drainage System, see Richlands Irrigation Co. v. Westview Irrigation, et 
al., Case No. 843, Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Millard County, November 30, 
1936. Mem. Dec. I at p. 9-10, TR 465-466. 
13. New Escalante presented evidence that its water right was never properly 
adjudicated in the Decree. For example, New Escalante presented the testimony of an 
Assistant Attorney General who stated in a related proceeding that the "water right that is 
in dispute here is sort of in no man's land. It's sitting up there on the divide . . . it was not 
adjudicated in the Cox Decree. And so it's open game, as far as we're concerned." See 
Memo in Support Exhibit 1, at p. 8, TR 345. 
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14. The trial court found, in Mem. Dec. /, that issues of fact precluded the entry 
of summary judgment against New Escalante and ruled that "there is evidence that New 
Escalante may not have received notice of the Richlands case." Mem. Dec. I, p. 9, TR 
465. The trial court directed the parties to further brief the "notice issue" in a renewed 
motion for summary judgment at an appropriate time. Mem. Dec. I, p. 12, TR 468. 
15. Both parties renewed their motions for summary judgment and the trial 
court heard argument on June 20, 2006. 
16. In its Memorandum Decision on Motions for Summary Judgment, Case 
No. 01060014, September 28, 2006 (<(Mem. Dec. II"), the trial court granted Otter 
Creek's motion for summary judgment on one issue, finding that the Iron Springs waters 
were properly adjudicated in the Cox Decree in 1936. Mem. Dec. II, p. 15, TR 918. (A 
copy of Mem. II is attached as Appendix 2.) New Escalante disagrees with this ruling 
and has preserved it for appeal, if necessary. 
17. In Mem. Dec. II, the trial court also partially granted New Escalante's 
motion for summary judgment, relying on this Court's precedent, holding that New 
Escalante's water right may be founded on the basis of adverse use following the entry of 
the Cox Decree in December of 1936 and "still ripen into a full adverse possession 
claim" after 1939. Mem. Dec. II, p. 13, TR 916. Because "our Supreme Court had 
determined that the 1939 amendment was not retroactive . . . Defendant's ripening right 
2
 The trial court did not fully grant New Escalante's motion for summary judgment 
because of concerns about the adequacy of the factual record and permitted such 
elements to be proved at trial. Mem. Dec. II, p. 16, TR 919. 
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should not be burdened and should not be extinguished." Mem. Dec. II, TR 912. 
'"[Fjollowing an amendment of Utah's Water Code in 1939, adverse use that began 
before 1939 could still ripen into title after the effective date of the Act."5 Mem. Dec. II, 
p. 12, TR 915 (quoting, Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 5 P.3d 1206 (Utah 
2000)). 
18. Otter Creek filed the instant interlocutory appeal to this Court seeking to 
reverse the trial court's ruling in favor of New Escalante on the issue of adverse 
possession. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
New Escalante has beneficially used waters from Iron Springs Draw for irrigation 
purposes since the late 1800s. New Escalante has always diverted those waters and Otter 
Creek has never used them. Unlike the apocryphal stories of water thefts and murders 
alluded to by Otter Creek in its Opening Brief, New Escalante has not diverted from Otter 
Creek's ditches and has stolen no water. Indeed, the equities here are the obverse of 
those presented by Otter Creek's stories: Otter Creek attempts by its lawsuit to obtain 
from New Escalante something it has never had, and which New Escalante has always 
used to satisfy irrigation needs in one of the most arid zones in the state. 
This Court has acknowledged on several occasions that water rights could be 
acquired by adverse possession before the statutory change in 1939. This Court has also 
clearly stated on more than one occasion (and as recently as 2000) that rights based in 
adverse use beginning before 1939 could continue to ripen after that date. Otter Creek 
opposes these clear precedents, arguing that the Court either did not know what it was 
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doing or didn't mean what it said. Otter Creek is wrong on both accounts. These prior 
pronouncements were reasoned and fair, both under the facts of those cases and 
especially as they apply to the facts presented by the present dispute. 
New Escalante believes that its long-standing rights to water from Iron Springs 
Draw were not extinguished by the Cox Decree. Even if the trial court were correct in 
ruling that the Cox Decree cut off those rights, however, it properly held that New 
Escalante's continuing use of that water after entry of the Cox Decree was adverse to 
Otter Creek and began a seven-year period which, if confirmed at trial, would reestablish 
New Escalante's right to that water. The trial court properly relied on prior 
pronouncements of this Court to the effect that the 1939 amendments to the appropriation 
statutes precluded claims for adverse possession of water base on use beginning after that 
date but did not cut off ripening rights based in prior and continuing use. 
There is no language in the 1939 amendments to indicate that the legislature 
intended them to operate retroactively and cut off ripening rights. This Court has 
previously acknowledged that ripening rights based in pre-1939 use were not cut off by 
the amendments, and Otter Creek has not met its substantial burden of showing that the 
Court erred or that it should overturn its own precedent. If New Escalante demonstrates 
at trial that it beneficially used those waters for at least seven years after 1936, it will 
have reestablished its rights to their continued use. 
The result argued for by New Escalante and ordered by the trial court is the correct 
one, both under Utah law and under the facts of this case. No new precedent will be 
established and, because of the acknowledged cutoff for the beginning of new claims 
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nearly 70 years ago, the confirmation of established precedent could have only limited, if 
any, future applicability. For all the above reasons, the trial court's order must be 
affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. WATER RIGHTS COULD BE ACQUIRED IN UTAH BY SEVEN YEARS 
OF CONTINUOUS USE COMMENCING PRIOR TO 1939, 
In its September 26, 2006 ruling on the parties' cross-motions for summary 
judgment, the trial court first found that New Escalante was bound by the Cox Decree 
which did not award the waters of Iron Springs Draw to New Escalante. The Court then 
found that New Escalante's continuing use of those waters beginning immediately after 
entry of the Cox Decree was adverse to the claims of Otter Creek and ripened into a 
possessory right if New Escalante's use is determined at trial to have continued, as it has, 
for more than the requisite seven years. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court 
addressed the arguments and authorities cited by both parties and, based on the plain 
language of prior decisions of this Court, determined that adverse use that began prior to 
the 1939 amendments to the appropriation statute could still ripen after the effective date 
of those amendments. In other words, the 1939 amendments did not operate to cut off 
already ripening rights. It is from this holding that Otter Creek has taken its appeal. 
The trial court was correct in its analysis of the effect of the 1939 amendments. Its 
ruling was accurate on the law and consonant with the prior declarations of this Court. It 
accords with the facts and equities presented by this case. It was a right and fair decision 
and should be affirmed. 
1 
A. Prior Decisions of this Court Confirm that an Adverse Use Claim that 
Commences Prior to 1939 may Continue to Ripen After 1939. 
If the trial court were correct in its holding about the effect of the Cox Decree on 
New Escalante's claim to the waters in Iron Springs Draw, then New Escalante's 
continued use of those waters thereafter was unquestionably adverse to the interests of 
Otter Creek. The facts placed before the trial court in connection with the serial motions 
for summary judgment indicate without any contradiction that New Escalante continued 
to use those waters after the Cox Decree (and have continued to do so until the present 
time). The prior decisions of this Court confirm that adverse use beginning in 1936 will 
continue to ripen through the requisite period of seven years of continuous use even after 
1939. 
1. Adverse use claims were valid in 1936 when Defendant 
initiated its adverse use. 
Though Otter Creek would like now to reargue cases that were decided decades 
ago, the case law plainly demonstrates title to water could "be acquired by adverse 
possession" between 1903 and 1939. Wellsville East Field Irr. Co. v. Lindsey Land & 
Livestock, 137 P.2d 634, 640 (Utah 1943). Otter Creek conceded to the trial court that 
New Escalante had long, prior to 1939, specifically between 1936 and 1939, and for 
extended periods of more than seven years, enjoyed continuous, uninterrupted, hostile, 
open, notorious and adverse beneficial use of water from the Iron Springs area. See Otter 
Creek's undisputed fact No. 3 ("Defendant used and maintained the diversion ditch since 
about 1875 and particularly during the years immediately preceding the filing of the 
Richlands case and during the seventeen years while it was pending.") TR 594. See also 
2 
Alvey Affidavit at fflf 5-8, TR 460-463. New Escalante's continuing use of the water was 
under a claim of right, believing that it had diligence rights from some 50 years' of prior 
use of the water and being unaware of the Sevier River adjudication. 
The claim of right requirement is satisfied simply by open and notorious use by 
the adverse possessor, which use manifests an intent on occupying the property at issue. 
See e.g., Clark v. NorthwoodIrrigation & Water Co. ofFarmington, 11 P.2d 300, 304 
(Utah 1932) ("It must be hostile to the real owner, and with the intention to claim the land 
adversely to him. The claim must be manifest from the nature or circumstances of the 
possession, so that the owner may be informed of it, and that he shall not be misled into 
acquiescence in the assertion of a right adverse to his own title."); Richins v. Struhs, 412 
P.2d 314, 316 (Utah 1966) ("[T]he use must have been such that it is plainly apparent that 
the claimant is asserting a right so the servient owner either knows or should know that 
his property is being so used.")1 
In Hammond v. Johnson, 66 P.2d 894 (Utah 1937), the Court held that "[o]ne may 
obtain rights to the use of public waters by appropriation or may obtain private rights to 
the use of water by purchase, lease, or grant in recognition of the owner's title, or in 
derogation and defiance of the owner's title by disseisin of the owner and use and 
possession of the right for the statutory time, commonly called adverse possession." Id. at 
900. 
1 These cases deal with prescriptive easements or adverse possession of land. 
However, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized the similarities of the elements 
required to establish adverse use of land and adverse use of water. See Drainage 
Area of Bear River in Rich County v. Lamborn, 361 P.2d 407, 410 (Utah 1961). 
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Otter Creek seizes on language suggesting that there was some confusion about 
adverse possession during the period before 1939. See Clark v. North Cottonwood Irr. & 
Water Co., 11 P.2d 300, 304 (Utah 1932). A facial discrepancy between the reversionary 
timeline of five years and the adverse use requirement of seven years appears to have 
lead to this confusion. The issue there was whether title reverted to the state after five 
years of non-use so that adverse use could not really continue for seven years. However, 
Wellsville eliminated this confusion when it supported the outcome of Hammond and 
found "that notwithstanding the statute of appropriation, as between private claimants, 
water rights in Utah can be acquired by adverse user and possession/9 Wellsville, 137 
P.2d at 638 (emphasis added). This precedent established that the "adverser got 
something .. .as between the prior owner and the adverser, the adverser could after seven 
years of open, notorious etc., possession have his title quieted as against the prior owner." 
Id. The Court reasoned that if the adverser did not have some sort of right to the water 
then neither an adverser nor the prior owner would have title and they would be equal. 
Instead, "[b]y holding that the adverser had a superior title to that of the prior owner, we 
necessarily held that he got something by virtue of the seven years of adverse use and that 
title did not revert to the public after five years of adverse use." Id. 
3
 Otter Creek's argument on the interplay between the five-year forfeiture statute 
and the seven-year adverse possession period is not helpful to its cause: Otter 
Creek has never used the Iron Springs Draw waters that have been historically 
diverted by New Escalante. Under Otter Creek's analysis, Otter Creek's title to 
those unused waters would have reverted to the state in 1941, five years after entry 
of the Cox Decree. Since Otter Creek has never filed an application to appropriate 
those waters with the State Engineer, it could not now claim them. 
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These pronouncements support the trial court's conclusion that "an adverse 
possessor acquires some type of right" while it is in the process of satisfying the seven-
year period. TR 914. Thus, as the trial court found, the precedent in Hammond and 
Wellsville, established that New Escalante's right to claim water through adverse 
possession began to ripen in 1936, the day after the Cox Decree when New Escalante's 
use became adverse to Otter Creek.4 
2. Initiation of use prior to 1939 allows New Escalante to establish an 
adverse use claim that ripened after 1939. 
More recent precedent has plainly confirmed that a party may establish an adverse 
use claim beginning prior to 1939 and continuing after that date. This Court has stated: 
Following an amendment to Utah's Water Code in 
1939 an adverse use that began before 1939 could still 
ripen into title after the effective date of the Act. 
However, adverse use commenced after the effective 
date of the act could not ripen into title by adverse 
possession. 
Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 5 P.3d 1221 n. 19 (Utah 2000). Had the 
adverse user in Silver Fork "proved seven years of continuous, uninterrupted, hostile, 
notorious, and adverse enjoyment under claim of title beginning prior to 1939" the Court 
4
 Further, the 1933 statute restricting appropriation of unappropriated waters does 
not apply here, as argued by Otter Creek. That statute is consonant with the statute 
effective in 1936 and concerned only the "[rjights to the use of unappropriated 
public waters." R.S. 1933 § 100-1-4 (as amended) (emphasis added). Under Otter 
Creek's construct, the Iron Springs waters had already been adjudicated in its 
favor. If so, they had been appropriated and were subject to adverse possession. 
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would have recognized and validated his adverse use claim. Id. at 1222 (emphasis 
added). 
Silver Fork, concerned a dispute over ownership of water being discharged from a 
nearby mine. Since the party claiming adverse use could not show that use had 
commenced prior to 1939 the court did not recognize the validity of his pre-1939 claim. 
The Court acknowledged, however, that an adverse use claim beginning prior to 1939 
could ripen into title through adverse possession. Id. In making its analysis, the Court 
discussed Wellsville and Mitchell v. Spanish Fork West Field Irrigation Co., 265 P.2d 
1016 (Utah 1954). The Silver Fork Court used these two cases to demonstrate that 
adverse possession claims may be initiated prior to 1939 and ripen into title through 
adverse possession upon establishing seven years of continuous use. 
In Mitchell, the "[p]laintiff s claim to the waters in question is based on adverse 
user from 1899 to 1939; since which date the initiation of water rights by this method has 
been precluded by statute." Id. at 1019 (emphasis added). The concept of initiation 
found in Mitchell was used by the trial court to support the decision that "Defendant's 
right initiated in December of 1936 may still ripen into a full adverse possession claim, 
provided the Defendant's use meets other necessary elements." Mem. Dec. II, p. 13, 
TR916.5 
5
 Otter Creek essentially asks the Court to overrule the cases relied upon by the 
trial court. As shown above, this precedent provides that so long as an adverse 
claim was initiated before the 1939 amendments, the claim was commenced and 
could continue to ripen thereafter. Otter Creek has not met the heavy burden 
required to support such a request: 
6 
The Oregon Supreme Court has held similarly. In Staub v. Jensen, 178 P.2d 931, 
932 (Or. 1947) the plaintiff occupied land beginning in 1907 and "water had been used 
on the place for irrigation purposes continuously ever since the year 1907." In 1909, the 
Oregon Legislature passed an act "providing a system for the regulation, control, 
distribution, use, and right to the use of water, and for the determination, use, and right to 
the use of water, and for the determination of existing rights thereto within the State of 
Oregon." Id. at 933 (internal quotations and citations omitted). "By this act, the state 
definitely abandoned the old method of appropriation of water by mere diversion and 
application to beneficial use, and adopted in lieu thereof a system of filing all 
applications to appropriate water with the state engineer, who, upon approval thereof, 
issues formal permits to the applicants." Id. 
In 1947, when Staub came before the Oregon Supreme Court, the defendant 
argued that because the 1909 law prohibited adverse use claims, the plaintiff was 
prohibited from asserting a claim based on adverse use. Id. at 933. However, the Court 
dismissed this argument because the plaintiffs appropriation was initiated by diversion 
Under the doctrine of stare decisis, those asking us to 
overturn prior precedent have a substantial burden of 
persuasion. We will not overturn precedent 'unless 
clearly convinced that the rule was originally 
erroneous or is no longer (continued) sound because of 
changing conditions and that more good than harm 
will come by departing from precedent.' 
Laney v. Fairview City, 57 P.3d 1007, 1021 (Utah 2002) (internal citations 
omitted). 
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and use in reliance on the old law prior to the adoption of the 1909 water code. Id. This 
case is instructive in the present action. 
In sum, this Court has held that adverse use was a valid claim prior to 1939, see 
Wellsville, 137 P.2d at 638, and that only the initiation of water rights was precluded by 
the statute after 1939, see Mitchell, 265 P.2d 1016, 1019. This result obtains because the 
1939 amendment to the appropriation statute was not retroactive. 
B. The 1939 Statute was not Retroactive and does not Bar 
Adverse Use Claims Based on Use Beginning Prior to 1939. 
Otter Creek claims that that New Escalante's ripening adverse use claim was cut 
off by the 1939 amendment to the appropriation statute. Otter Creek is wrong. The 1939 
"amendment [to the water appropriation statute] is not retroactive." Wellsville East Field 
Irr. Co. v. Lindsay Land & Livestock Co., 137 P.2d, at 656 (Hoyt, J. concurring). The 
statute gives no indication that it was meant to be retroactive. According to the Utah 
Code, no statute "is retroactive, unless expressly so declared." Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 
(2006) (previously codified at R.S. 1898, § 2490; C.L. 1907, § 2490; C.L. 1917, § 5840; 
R.S. 1933, § 88-2-3; C. 1943, § 88-2-3). 
This principle has been extensively upheld in Utah case law. "It is a long-standing 
rule of statutory construction that a legislative enactment which alters the substantive law 
or affects vested rights will not be read to operate retrospectively unless the legislature 
has clearly expressed that intention." Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 253 (Utah 1988) 
(citing Schultz v. Conger, 755 P.2d 165, 166 (Utah 1988); Stephens v. Henderson, 741 
P.2d 952, 953-54 (Utah 1987); Pilcher v. State, 663 P.2d 450, 455 (Utah 1983). 
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As the trial court pointed out, the Wellsville Court did not define the term 
"retroactive." Looking for extrinsic guidance, the trial court found that "'[rjetroactive 
means 'not intended to impose any new burden duty, obligation, or liability concerning 
past events."' Mem. Dec. II, p. 8, TR 911-912 (citing The Law Dictionary, (2002) 
(Anderson Publishing Co.)). Applying the 1939 statute to prohibit New Escalante from 
asserting its claim, the trial court held, would be a retroactive action which was not 
permitted by the statute. "The past event here was the time period from 1936 to 1939, 
during which the Defendant was in the process of acquiring a water right by adverse 
possession.... Prohibiting] the Defendant from completing the acquisition ... would be 
tantamount to imposing an additional burden on the Defendant and would be retroactive 
in that case." Mem. Dec. II, p. 9, TR 912. 
The trial court was correct in its determination that creating a prohibition on 
adverse use after New Escalante had admittedly started, and progressed with, the seven 
year adverse use period would be an extreme and unfounded burden. Where the 1939 
amendments to the statute are not expressly made retroactive the statute cannot now be 
applied to extinguish New Escalante's water right. 
II. OTTER CREEK'S ARGUMENTS ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE 
AUTHORITIES IT CITES. 
Otter Creek's arguments are inconsistent with the statutes and the case law it cites. 
As discussed above, the statute in place in 1936 only restricted the appropriation of 
previously unappropriated water; it did not purport to bar adverse use claims for 
previously appropriated water. Otter Creek contends that the Cox Decree established its 
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rights in the waters diverted by New Escalante and, accordingly, the 1936 statute did not 
apply. Moreover, the 1939 amendments were not retroactive and did not cut off New 
Escalante's ripening rights. Also, the case law cited above and relied upon by the trial 
court confirms that an adverse use claim may be based on use beginning prior to 1939 
and continuing thereafter. 
Otter Creek cites two additional cases, Smith v. Sanders, 189 P.2d 701 (Utah 
1948) and In re Drainage Area of Bear River in Rich County, 361 P.2d 406 (Utah 1961), 
which are distinguishable because they do not address the narrow issue pending before 
the Court. Opening Brief, pp. 27-28. 
In Smith, the plaintiff failed to prove the elements of adverse use. In discussing 
the case the Court only states what is not in doubt: that "water could be obtained by 
adverse possession before our legislature in Session Laws of Utah, 1939, Ch. I l l , 
amended Sec. 100-3-1, R.S.U. 1933, and prohibited the acquiring of the right to the use 
of either appropriated or unappropriated waters by adverse possession." Id. at 703. In 
Smith, the water was from a new water source which had not previously been 
appropriated. Having never been appropriated it was not eligible - either during the 1903 
to 1939 period or after 1939 - for appropriation by adverse use because it was owned by 
the State. The Smith Court was simply restating the status of the law; it did not address 
the issue of an adverse use claim to appropriated water overlapping the enactment of the 
1939 statute. 
In In re Drainage Area of Bear River in Rich County, the Court also dealt with 
claimed adverse use occurring between 1919 and 1939. The narrow language of Bear 
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River states "appellants could acquire water rights by adverse use only by continuous 
adverse use for seven years after the 1919 decree and before the 1939 statute." Id. at 410. 
The Court correctly noted that an adverse use claim based on a seven-year period ending 
before 1939 would give a water user a valid water right. That language is consistent with 
other holdings that the adverse use must be initiated before 1939. Bear River did not, 
however, address the issue presented in this case. In particular, the Court did not state 
that claims based in a seven-year period of use beginning before 1939 and ending after 
that date are cut off. The Court simply did not need to consider the possibility of such a 
claim.6 
III. THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT PROVIDES THE ONLY 
EQUITABLE OUTCOME IN THIS CASE. 
New Escalante has diverted and beneficially used the waters of Iron Springs Draw 
for well over a century, including during the 71 years since the entry of the Cox Decree. 
New Escalante's use of those waters under its claim of a diligence right was adverse to 
Otter Creek, according to the trial court, since December 1, 1936. There is no basis in 
law or equity for Otter Creek to interrupt that use and, by mere argument, obtain 
something it has never had. Wellsville again provides the appropriate setting for 
consideration of this case: 
6
 The trial court here could also have determined that, since New Escalante's use began 
long before 1936, it was adverse to Otter Creek from the time Otter Creek was served 
with process in the general adjudication proceedings in 1921 and thereafter asserted its 
claim to water in the Sevier River drainage. TR 713. 
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It is important to water titles in this State that this 
matter be settled and it should be settled so as to cause 
as little disturbance in water titles as possible. Any 
person who has failed to use his water for seven years 
has either forfeited it to the public or lost title to some 
adverse user. Not only has he lost title, but he has not 
been using the water and will not be seriously injured 
if he is told that he cannot use it in the future. 
Id. at 640. It is important that this case be decided so as to cause as little disturbance as 
possible. New Escalante should be allowed to prove at trial that they have used this 
water continuously since 1936 and, indeed, much earlier. Otter Creek has never used this 
water and therefore will not be injured if New Escalante's rights are affirmed. 
The case law on a period of adverse use overlapping the 1939 amendments is 
sparse but sound, and that precedent supports the ruling of the trial court. Otter Creek has 
shown no harm from that precedent and has offered no basis to overturn it, and it is 
entirely possible that no later case on this point will ever arise. New Escalante has been 
using this water under the belief that it is entitled to do so as long as anyone can 
remember. Overruling the trial court and destroying New Escalante's right to prove its 
adverse use claim would be unjust and unfair. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Trial Court's determination that New 
Escalante should be allowed to document at trial an adverse use period beginning in 1936 
and continuing after the 1939 amendments should be affirmed. 
Dated this 20th day of June 2007. 
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON 
STEVEN E. CLYDE 
EDWIN C. BARNES 
CHRISTOPHER B. SNOW 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
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CLERK JJtffi 
DISTRICT COURT, PIUTE COUNTY, UTAH 
550 North Main Street 
Junction, Utah 84740 
Telephone: 435-577-2433 Fax- 435-577-2433 
OTTER CREEK RESERVOIR COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, and OTHERS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
NEW ESCALANTE IRRIGATION 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON 
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. 010600014 
Assigned Judge: David L. Mower 
INTRODUCTION 
This case involves a dispute over the rights to use water from a source located in the 
Escalante Mountains in Garfield County called Iron Spring. The plaintiifs have filed a motion for 
summary judgment and the defendant has filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. The court 
has been briefed extensively on the motions, has visited the site and has heard oral argument 
from counsel on two separate occasions. The matter is now ready for a decision. 
FACTS 
1. Escalante, Utah is a town in Garfield County. It was settled in 1876. Its elevation is 
5,800 feet above sea level. 
u<m 
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River drainage and the Escalante River drainage.1 
3. At some time prior to the 1890fs the people of Escalante found a water source called Iron 
Spring. It is located near the Griffin Top ridge line at an elevation of over 10,000 feet. It 
is in Section 1, Township 33 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. The 
latitude and longitude coordinates are 37.961 degrees North latitude by 111.844 degrees 
West longitude. Water flowing out of Iron Spring would naturally flow east through Iron 
Spring Draw (also called Sink Hole Draw) and north into Coyote Hollow and Antimony 
Creek, which is a tributary of the Sevier River. 
4. A man-made ditch diverts Iron Spring water from the Sevier River drainage basin by 
redirecting it south and east toward a geologic feature called The Gap and from thence 
into North Creek (a tributary of the Escalante River which in turn flows into the Colorado 
The Sevier River is a basin river with no outlet to an ocean. The Escalante River is 
a tributary to the Colorado River, which flows into the Pacific Ocean. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, Case number 
010600014, Page-3-
River) and into the defendant's irrigation system. This trans-basin diversion is the 
dispute in this case. 
5. I visited Iron Spring on October 12, 2004. The parties and counsel were with me. 
a. We located Iron Spring and also the ditch leading from it. 
b. The spring itself was surrounded by a fairly broad and flat area which was dry and 
filled with rocks and plant life. The rocks had water rings or marks. The plants, 
which appeared to be dead or dormant, were consistent with wetland growth. 
c. The spring was on the uphill side of the broad flat area. The ditch began on the 
opposite and downhill side. 
d. There was water flowing from the spring, but it disappeared into the rocky soil. 
e. There was no water flowing in the ditch at that time. 
6. According to affidavits supplied by Gail C. Bailey, Melvin Alvey, Neil Liston, Usher 
Spencer and Doyle Cottam, this ditch was constructed in the early 1890's by members of 
the Old Escalante Irrigation Company, defendant's predecessor in interest. Many of these 
members were direct ancestors of the affiants. 
a. Gail C. Bailey signed an affidavit in January 1992. He states, "I remember being 
in Sink Hole Draw ... when I was a boy of fifteen .... [TJhere was a ditch that run 
[sic] the water off of the mountain into North Creek for irrigation purposes. This 
ditch must have dug before 1919." Mr. Bailey was born in 1904. 
b. Melvin Alvey, born in 1908, signed two affidavits; the first in January 1992 and 
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the second in October 2001. Mr. Alvey has a long history with the defendant; he 
was a Board Member for 43 years, President for 25 years, and Water Master for 
10 years. 
i. The first affidavit states, " In 1925 when I was a lad of 17 years Harvey 
Bailey hired me to go drive his team to help maintain the ditch on the 
Griffin Top of the mountain at the head of Sink Hole Draw. Also I 
remember going up there when I was quite young to get horses off the 
mountain .... The ditch was there at that time." 
ii. He states in the second affidavit, 
(1) "According to rny understanding of the early history of the 
Escalante Irrigation Company, construction on the Ditch was to 
have occurred in the early 1890's ... My first personal experience 
with the Ditch came in 1916, as an 8-year old boy .... It was at this 
time in 1916, prior to World War I that I first saw the Ditch with 
my own eyes, although I had repeatedly heard about the Ditch and 
its importance even before that time." 
(2) "The Ditch has been continuously maintained and the water 
diverted into the North Creek/Escalante drainage since the early 
1890's." 
(3) "We never received notice of the adjudication conducted for the 
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Sevier river and its tributaries, and were not provided an 
opportunity to make a claim to this water in that proceeding." 
c. Neal Liston, a lifetime resident of Escalante, signed an affidavit in January 1992. 
He recounts "... as a very young boy [I] remember going up with my dad up on 
the mountain to repair the old North Creek high water ditch that brought water 
fiom the top of the Griffin down through North Creek. From listening to my dad 
and other early settlers, that ditch was put in place before the turn of the century, 
not many years after the town was settled in 1876." Mr. Liston was born in 1909. 
d. Usher Spencer, a resident of Escalante for 86V2 years, signed an affidavit in 
January 1992. He recalls, "I was 8 or ten when I first heard of the Griffin Top 
drainage ... . [W]hile 1 was working for the Company on the Mountain, 1 was 14 
or 16, I saw some of the men hitch their teams on their scrapers and ... go out on 
top of the Mountain (Griffin) and clean the ditch that brought water to Escalante. 
I had heard before how they would do this, but this was the first time I had saw 
[sic] them do it." 
e. Doyle Cottam, a lifetime resident and farmer of Escalante, signed an affidavit in 
January 1992. He states, "I helped clean the old dirt canals as a young man. 
Thelma's (my wife) grandfather told me some of the men who worked on the 
Griffin Top on the old canal. I remember as a young man when the high water 
(snow water) broke loose and how we depended on this run off from the Griffin 
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Top/' Mr. Cottam was born in 1921. 
7. The ditch is subject to spring-time flowing and freezing cycles. 
a. Water flows during the day and then freezes at night. The next day's water flow is 
blocked by the previous night's ice, causing the water to overflow the ditch banks 
and wash them out. 
b. The flood- and overflow-water flows into the Sevier River system while the 
remainder continues on down the ditch into the Escalante River system. 
c. The defendant annually restores and maintains the ditch banks to direct the water 
flow to The Gap. This started with the use of horses and scrapers and then 
progressed into mechanized equipment in the 1930's. 
8. In 1903 the water law in Utah was changed significantly when the Legislature adopted the 
Water Filing Act of 1903. It is the predecessor to current Utah statutes which include 
section 73-3-1, a portion which reads: 
No appropriation of water may be made ... except 
application ... first be made to the state engineer... . 
9. In 1936 a case was pending in the District Court in Millard County, Utah, The name of 
the case is Richlands Irrigation Company v. West View Irrigation Company, Case No. 
843. The case had become a general adjudication case which is a particular type of 
water-rights appropriation case governed by Chapter 4 of Title 73 of the Utah Code. 
a. Sections 73-4-3 and 73-4-5 sets forth certain requirements for giving notice to 
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potential water-rights claimants and for making claims. 
b. There is a consequence for failing to make a claim. 
... [A]ny person failing to make [a] claim ... shall be forever 
barred and estopped from subsequently asserting any rights, 
and shall be held to have forfeited all rights to the use of the 
water theretofore claimed by him. 73-4-9, clause 2. 
10. On November 30, 1936 Judge LcRoy H. Cox issued a decree in Richlands. According to 
the decree it was a general adjudication of"... the waters of the Sevier River and its 
tributaries, including springs and wells, all of which are hereinafter referred to as the 
Sevier River System." (Cox Decree, page 1, paragraph 1.) 
a. This decree has become known as the "Cox Decree." 
b. It is a many-page document and includes names of many water courses and water 
sources. 
c. The name "Iron Spring" is not found in it 
d. No claim to Iron Spring was filed by the defendant. 
11. In 1997 defendant changed the ditch significantly by removing dirt from the channel and 
using it to increase the height of the ditch banks. 
12. The ditch has never contained any water-measuring or water-recording devices and there 
is no evidence about the quantity of water flowing from Iron Spring or flowing through 
The Gap. 
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The plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is denied. The defendant's cross motion is 
denied. 1 will explain. 
ANALYSIS 
The plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is based upon the argument (1) that the 
right to use water from Iron Spring has already been adjudicated in the Cox Decree, (2) that 
defendant failed to file a claim, and (3) that, therefore, defendant is barred from asserting any 
right to the water. The defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment is based on two 
theories. First, that it has a valid right to use the water based on beneficial use thereof since 
before 1903. Second, in the alternative, that it obtained the right to use the water through adverse 
possession. I will discuss each in turn. 
Analysis, Part 1. Plaintiffs argument based on the Cox Decree 
The purpose of a general adjudication is to determine and settle water rights which have 
not been adjudicated, remain uncertain or in dispute. Green River Adjudication v. United States, 
17 Utah 2d 50, 52 (Utah, 1965). Another basic goal of a general adjudication "is to record all 
water claims from a particular source which subsequent appropriators can rely upon before 
making their investments." Provo River Water Users' Ass'n v. Morgan, 857 P.2d 927, 935 
(Utah, 1993). The judgment must have some degree of finality and solidarity, meaning water 
rights which have been or could have been claimed within the adjudication arc concluded by it. 
Green River, 17 Utah 2d at 52. 
It is evident that the Cox Decree sought to determine and settle all water rights in the 
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Sevier River drainage basin,. This can be seen from the opening paragraph which states, " I 'his 
various claimants to the vwiter cr'the Sevier Rivei and \b mhuarus. including springs and wells, 
a.- . .J ' aie here;i..i:i..". u-;^..^.. .. *., <..*. . .,* >*..•• ^» vi^ r,. ^ • A uccree, page 1, 
paragraph 1). The word "system" connotes the entiie hydrological system. Provo River, 857 
P.2dat931. 
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tributary of the Sevier River It seems logical u< ».L V; x *>ne ,HC :\VA\ Iron Spring was adjudicated 
in the Cox Decree even though it was never specific ,Mi *• *,..,;, J 
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 c ] a j m t0 j , 0I1 Spring was ever filed by "New Escalante. In a general adjudication it is 
essential that everyone whose rights are involved oi may be affected be made parties to the 
that 1 he \ he bourd b <-i' - '>. /<\MJ* ' ! \ih Mai S2 A parn ^ not bound b\ t 
general adjudication determination unless he was given .^i\u. u:iu ..iiiice :na: is reasonably 
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise him of the pendency of the action and to afford 
him an opportunity to present his objections. Provo River, 857 P.2d at 935. 
case. That evidence comes from a one-sentence statement in the second affidavit of MeK.;. 
Alvey. He states, "we never received notice ^t I.K adj.kucahon coi lduc:^ :..i :;K V:\;CJ i.-.-er 
and its tributaries, and were not provided an opportunity to make a claim to this water in that 
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proceeding." The application of the Cox Decree to this dispute is of great importance. The issue 
cannot be resolved until a better factual picture regarding notice is developed. 
In other words, there is a dispute about the sufficiency of the notice upon which the Cox 
Decree is based. Until that dispute is resolved, summary judgment is not appropriate and will not 
be granted. 
Analysis Part 2. Defendant's claimed pre-1903 beneficial use. 
A diligence claim is a claim to a water right established by proving that the water was put 
to beneficial use prior to 1903, when the statutes creating the mandatory application process went 
into effect Provo River, 857 P.2d at 929 (citing Eskelsen v. Town of Perry, 819 P.2d 770, 771 
n. 1 (Utah 1991). In the past the standards were rigid in establishing proof of a diligence or pre-
1903 claim. See ML Olivet Cemetery Ass 'n v. Salt Lake City, 65 Utah 193 (Utah 1925). 
However the Supreme Court in recent years has realized that it would be unrealistic to expect 
direct and specific evidence. Eskelsen, 819, P.2d at 774. The new standard to apply is to 
determine whether the evidence establishes pre-1903 use with reasonable certainty. Id. 
The evidence produced by the affiants in this case could be interpreted to conclude that 
before 1903 the waters of Iron Spring were diverted into a ditch by New Escalante and put to 
beneficial use. It goes without saying that such an interpretation is disputed by plaintiffs. 
It is not necessary to resolve that dispute at the present time. In fact, it is possible that no 
decision on this theory will ever be required depending on the outcome of the notice issue in 
regards to the Cox Decree. Therefore, I decline to grant summary judgment on this theory until 
M E M O R A N D U M DECISI01 1 31 1 1 1C » I ICtt IS I -OR SI IN II , I iF \ ) I IDGI * IE1 4 1 Case i n n i ! n MI 
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the notice issue is resolved. 
Analysis I  .ill I lli il* inl iiiiiil's nil 11 si |MISM SSIIMI Linn 
In the alternative, the defendant has argued it has a right to use Iron Spring water through 
adverse possession, Only appropriated water is subject to adverse possession. Smith v. Sanders, 
112 I Ital i 51 /'" 520 (I Ital i 19 1-8). Il 1 ie watet s oi Ii oi l Spi ii ig "'* \ ere appi opi iated ii i 11936 b) t:1 ite 
Cox Decree, m / M ^ the legislature established that the riuht to . inpicpuate water could no 
longer be acqunc.i u . „.: erse poss.•• . *• 
for defendant to have an adverse possession claim that started after 1936 but before 1939. 
A water right can be obtained by adverse possession if the following conditions are met: 
seven years ofcoi itiii « i :)i is, i m ii ' " 1 lostile, i lotoi ioi is, am id a dvei se ei n jo} i i iei: it \ it i iei a 
claim of title with knowledge and acquiescence of the owner of the prior right and at a time when 
the owner oi -iu :igh: noetic; ,:.. ,-. au;* J O ^ J ; *..:/ claimed. Salt L i ike City ' \ \ S ilvet 1 ;: brk I Pipeline 
Corp., 2000 U 1 3, V 4o ^Uiah 2000) (emphasis by the undersigned.) 
In the context of this case, the owner of the prior right would be all the downstream users 
holding "' alid i ights. ' 1 1 ie pi c: blei t. i is tl lat it is" lot :1 *ai ( <i: :ietl let the owner (or owners ) of the 
pr ior rights are par t ies . Due process would require that all ownei s have not ice and opportuni ty to 
be heai d bei "oi e ecu n I: appi o < 'a! is gi fei i tc an ad> 'ei se possess ioi i clan i i 
] } i a v e r ev iewed plaintiffs ' complaint . I "hey do claim to be owner s of prior rights. 
1 lowever , the compla in t is silent as to whe the r they o w n all the prior rights, T h e defendan t ' s 
i in lotion does not a tteim i; ipt: to idei ilif; till i z o ' v i it ;:M s i/1 ithc i it then 11: eliel '• : annot be gi anted 
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CONCLUSION 
The plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is denied. The denial is without prejudice. 
I am hopeful that the notice issue can be developed and focused through additional affidavits and 
another summary judgment motion. The resolution of that issue may substantially resolve the 
entire case. 
The defendant's motion is also denied without prejudice. Defendant should feel free to 
move for summary judgment in the future if conditions warrant. 
Date /p'/l , 2005 ( \ f ' Q ^ ^ 
David L. Mower C*^ fa ~fiftg 
District Court Judge ^ - — - - ^ {ufndvud 
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Certificate of Notification 
Oi i fo - / /""" 2005, a copy of the above was sent to 
Edwin C. Barnes 
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON 
Attorneys for Defendant 
201 South Main St., 13"'Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 -2216 
Richard K. Chamberlain 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
225 North 100 East 
PO Box 100 
Richfield, UT 84701 
Robert A. Peterson 
HENDINGER CROCKETT PETERSON & 
CASEY 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
170 South Main St., Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
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OTTER CREEK RESERVOIR COMPANY 
a Utah corporation; RICHFIELD 
IRRIGATION CANAL COMPANY , a Utah 
corporation; SEVIER VALLEY CANAL 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation; MONROb 
SOUTH BEND CANAL COMPANY, a I Hah 
corporation; MONROE IRRIGATION 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation; ELSINORE 
CANAL COMPANY, a Utah corporation; 
ANNABELLA IRRIGATION COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation; BROOKLYN CANAL 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation; JOSEPH 
IRRIGATION COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation; VERMILLION IRRIGATION 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation; and PIUTE 
RESERVOIR AND IRRIGATION 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
PI inil II 
NEW ESCALANlLiRRIGAllON 
COMPANY, a Utah corpoiauon, 
Defendant. 
I P R O D U C T I O N 
I hi -1 i>e i I it-11vi i llu i'ourl on cross-motions lor snrnmaiy judgment Oia 1 argument 
was held on June 20, 2006 This mattei is now leady tor a decision. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON 
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Case No 01060014 
As-.ien.ii iu<i". 1) W l l > I Mi iWI \< 
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DECISION 
Plaintiffs Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment should be partially granted and 
partially denied. Defendant's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment should be partially granted 
and partially denied. 
ANALYSIS 
This is a dispute about water rights in a water source called Iron Spring which is located 
high in the Escalante Mountains at about 10,000-feet elevation west of Escalante, Utah in 
Garfield County. It is shown on USGS maps as being in Section 1, Township 33 South, Range 1 
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
The following issues are raised by the cross-motions for summary judgment: (1) whether 
the water source at issue was part of the general adjudication of the Sevier River System in the 
case of Richlands Irrigation Company v. West View Irrigation Company, (2) the sufficiency and 
effect of the notice in that case; (3) whether the Defendant could acquire water rights by adverse 
possession; and (4) whether the Defendant has satisfied all the elements of an adverse possession 
claim. The Court considers each issue in turn. 
1. Was the water source included? 
Defendant argues that the Iron Spring source was not included in the Richlands 
adjudication because the source was not mapped by the State Engineer. More specifically, the 
parties refer to the State of Utah Engineering Department 1924 Index Map of the Upper Sevier 
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River System. This map was prepared by the State Engineer for use in the Richlands case in 
conji mctioi i tfitl i his proposed cietet: i nil lati ::» i of the relative ;|( ate i i igl its in the Sei riei R :n ei 
Syster (Atfidivit ot Kirk Forbusn -n Re Mapping of the Sevier River System., 1]6.) Iron Spring 
is 
This map shows Uie Pub:.* -! ,and-Suivev I ownships and Ranges included in the Svverii. 
e 
number refers lo a ^oi responding nuip ->lu»u mji that seciion in greater Je'ai. I he ,;inv seci.ons 
M I i i ; * 
where water arose were nut -napped in detail1. 
tributaries have then uwn. smaller tributaries *\ ;xv ineludc springs and seeps. Usually, these aie 
The parties have stipulated that Iron Spring is a tributary to Coyote Creek, which is a 
t: ill :JI:It:i ; :i < tc • t h e E a s t I - o r k c if the Se1 net R b ei Co;;; rc te Creek is si :ic m i c i i th z 192 1 Hi idex 1\ lap It 
s in : uwnships 31 and 32 South, Ranges 2 West, I West, and 1 East, Salt Lake Base and 
n. 
I his is based on the explanation in Forbusb Affidavit, ]\S. Il reads: u[t]he mapping by the Slate 
Engineer focused on the lands where the water was to be used rather than the areas in which the 
water originates. As such, the mapping covered but a small fraction of the hydrological area of the 
Sevier River basin." 
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Iron Spring is not shown on the map. Nevertheless, it was included in the Richlands 
litigation. I will explain why I reach this conclusion. 
The Richlands litigation was presided over by Judge LeRoy H. Cox. He issued a final 
decree. It is widely used and cited as the Cox Decree. It contains this language: uThis cause has 
been brought... for the purpose of having determined the relative rights of the various claimants 
to the waters of Sevier River and its tributaries, including springs and wells, all of which are 
hereinafter referred to as the Sevier River System." (Decree Adjudicating the Sevier River 
System, Honorable LeRoy H. Cox, Case No. 843, <R1.) 
From this language I conclude that the System was defined by hydrology, meaning the 
combination of geography and the law of gravity. Judge Cox was determined to define the 
relative rights to all the water flowing into the Sevier River Drainage under the forces of 
geography and gravity. 
The water from Iron Spring would naturally flow into the Sevier River Drainage. Hence, 
it was included in the Cox Decree. 
2. Sufficiency of Notice 
Generally, a party is bound by the outcome of a general adjudication only if the notice 
given was reasonably calculated "to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and 
afford them an opportunity to present their objections." Provo River Water Users Association v. 
Morgan, 857 P.2d 927, 934 (Utah 1993). 
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The Richlands case was filed ii i Millard County 01 i April 28, 1919. In time it became a 
i2ciic : *" : r 
Engineer followed tl > notice procedure .suil.no> ; Section 22, \ hapier 67 of the Laws of Utah, 
1919. Not ices of tin : '-'• - : • • - • « • . -
the Richfield Reaper on October °, 1"20 Those responding were then personally served by the 
Stale hngmeer ' • • • 
Unknown claimants were served by publication, as permitted by the court order issued on 
Deseret News Fn our: had determined 'h^i 'he Deseret .\V;i ^ n -IS .he napei of "general 
cii ci ilatioi i ii :t Kai ic: Gai field I ii it :::i Se \ iei , Sai ipete, !"i iab 
likely to give notice -'irde?, September 22, 1925.) The summons was published in the 
Deser et \ ews foi fn e coi lseci itn ' e Satui days froi i i Octobei 3, 192,5 till Octobei 31. 1925, 
This evidence is sufficient to show that proper notice was given to the Defendant. 
I I: ic Defendai it • :oi n itei s this e ! 'idei ic :::: v itl i tl le i V/ffida1 it: : f K lei « 'in VI ey. 1 1 lis - ffida1 it 
contains the following statement: "We never received notice of the adjudication conducted for 
tl: ic Se> iei i h 'er ai: id its t::t: ibi itai ies, ai: id vv • ::: i e i i :::::il:: p i :::) < ide d ai it opp :::)i ti: ii: lit::;; tc :i :i take a claii i: i tc tl lis 
water in that proceeding, as well " 19. 
News All that is required to satisfy the notice requirement is that: the notice be "reasonably 
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calculated" to reach all potential claimants. In this case, the State Engineer published such a 
notice in the newspaper of general circulation in the counties where potential claimants resided. 
The Affidavit of Melvin Alvey does not raise any issues of material fact and does not preclude 
the finding that the notice was properly given to the Defendant. 
My conclusion is that the Defendant had sufficient notice of the Richlands litigation. 
The parties have stipulated that no statement of claim was filed by Defendant in the 
Richlands case. 
The statute in effect at the time read as follows: ". .. any person, corporation or 
association failing to make and deliver such statement of claim . .. shall be forever barred and 
estopped from subsequently asserting any rights and shall be held to have forfeited all rights to 
the use of said water " Laws of the State of Utah, Chapter 67, Section 29 (1919)2. 
This Court takes judicial notice of the contents of the decree issued by Judge Cox in the 
Richlands case on November 30, 1936. ("the Cox Decree.") It contains no mention of the 
Defendant nor of its predecessor. 
The Cox Decree adjudicated "the relative rights of various claimants to the waters of 
Sevier River and its tributaries, including springs and wells." Defendant made no claim and 
received no rights in the Iron Spring water source. It forfeited all rights to the use of water 
2
 This slalule is still in effect today. The entire legislative history is: History: L. 1919, ch, 67, § 29; 
R.S. 1933 &C. 1943,100-4-9. 
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arising therefrom. Its rights were properly determined. . „ 
3. Advei se Possession 
Defendant has advanced an alternative basis for relief in its favor,. The basis is adverse 
possessioi i Specifica 11/y , Defendant claii i is that it begai i adversely possessing w ater on 
Decembei ; h^ • has done so continuousl\ s nee then. 
i 
this case would be from 1936 J:VJ j l)-J > ! h<* piohlem here is that a significant event occurred in 
atute chai ige effected by the legislati n e in 
1939. 
I he stati ite w as Sectioi i 1 ^ ised Stati ites of I Ita I :t, 1,933 In 1939 the I egislati ii e 
added these words to the statute: 
No right to the use of water either appropriated or unappi opi iated 
can be acquired by adverse use or adverse possession3. 
* The complete text of Ihe pre-amcndmcrU aiid post-amendment statues is as follows: 
nber 1, 1936 the statute read as follows; 
Rights to the use of the unappropriated public waters in ibis slate may 
be acquired by appropriation in the manner hereinafter provided, and not 
otherwise. The appropriation must be for some useful and beneficial purpose, 
and, as between appropriators, the one first in time shall be first in right: 
provided, thaL when a use designated by an application to appropriate any 
unappropriated waters of the state would materially interfere with a more 
beneficial use of such water, the application shall be dealt with as provided ;u 
section 100-3-8,," Revised Statutes of I Jtali, Section 100-3-1 (1933),,, 
After the stattitc was amended in 1939 it read as follows: 
Rights to the use of the unappropriated public waLcrs in this state may be 
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The result of the statute change was significant for this case. After 1939 water rights 
could not be obtained by adverse possession. 
The Defendant's theory is that its adverse possession claim began in 1936 and was in the 
process of ripening as time passed thereafter. Hence, in 1939 the Defendant had some type of 
right, even though it was not a fully ripened adverse possession right. Thus, this Court has to 
decide whether the Defendant's right could still ripen after 1939 regardless of the change in the 
law or whether the 1939 amendment completely extinguished the Defendant's ripening right. 
This is a novel question. I have sought guidance from prior decisions of our appellate 
courts. 
In Wellsville East Field Irrigation Company v. Lindsay Land & Livestock, the Supreme 
Court held that the 1939 amendment was not retroactive. 137 P.2d 634, 656 (Utah 1943). 
The tenn "retroactive" is not defined in the case. I have found a definition in a law 
dictionaiy. "Retroactive" means unot intended to impose any new burden, duty, obligation, or 
acquired only as provided in this title. No appropriation of water may be made 
and no rights to the use thereof initiated and no notice of intent to appropriate 
shall be recognized except application for such appropriation first be made to the 
state engineer in the manner hereinafter provided, and not otherwise. The 
appropriation mut be for some useful and beneficial purpose, and, as between 
appropriators, the one first in lime shall be first in rights; provided, that when a 
use designated by an application to appropriate any of the unappropriated waters 
of the state would materially interfere with a more beneficial use of such water, 
the application shall be dealt with as provided in section 100-3-8. No right io the 
use of water either appropriated or unappropriated can be acquired by adverse 
use or adverse possession. Laws of the State of Utah, Section 100-3-1 (1939). 
(The underlined words arc those added by the 1939 amendment.) 
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liability concerning past evenis." 5M v TIv I , -o Dictionary (2002) (Anderson Publishing Co.) 
' I he past e \ f :::a it: 1 lei e * as tne iirne pei ioa n on: i i 1 9 3 6 to 1 9 3 9 , dri: n ii ::ig i * "1 rich 1:1 :te Defei ida nt 
was in the process ot acquiring a wjte?" iii;hi h\ adverse possession i! ihe statute prohibited the 
burden on the Defendant and would be retroactive in that sense. 
Mere out 'n ip ieme ( \nn i In t l i lnmi i inJ llnl tin I1" ^i jiiiniffnii hi <\ i-.iuil u l i o a u m 
Hence, Defendant ' s ripening right should uvf h - K r d c n e d and should not be extinguished 
•• .i . . i s 
only prospective application and is not retroactive However, there is a difference between a 
vested i igl it and a i ipenii ig i Igl it !"!li pi ospecth e stal: i ite 1 las no effect on vested i: ights; tl iej ai e 
protected. 
. . il 
1943. ?>>\ then the a:r;Ciulmeni wouM iia\e lu*en in effect foi 4 years and any clai:r hase<l ua 
aib ei se possessioi: I > ' ::)i i ld h :::: pi • ::)1 lit ited Sii ice Defendai it" s 1 igl its ivei e i lot i este :::! ii i 1939. they 
were extinguished by the amendment. 
1 Jh:i
"
 i!::iff s argi: n nent is tl lat this is tl: :ie coi i ect resi lit becai ise it is ai: lalogous to tl ic re si ill: in i 
Utah iJ'tb'i£ Employees Association v. Siofe, 131 P.3d 208 (Utah 2006). In that case, the 
en lployee benefits stati ite was amended in 2005 to all :::) c i ib ;" 7:5° o of a state en: iployee" s bai iked 
(in other words , accumulated/unused) sick leave accrued prior to January 1, 2006 to be used 
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toward medical and life insurance upon retirement. Id. at 211. The remaining 25% was to be 
contributed to the employee's 401(k) plan. Id. Prior to this amendment, retiring state employees 
could use 100% of their banked sick leave toward medical and life insurance coverage. Id. 
The amendment became effective on January 1, 2006. Every state employee who did not 
retire before that date became subject to this new provision. As a result, most government 
employees suffered a reduction in anticipated post-retirement medical- and life-insurance 
benefits. Several plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the amendment upon the theory 
that it took away their vested rights. 
The Supreme Court held that the rights of the state employees were not vested and would 
not become vested until retirement and that the statute did not work an illegal taking. 
The logic of the Utah Public Employees holding is closely analogous to the facts in the 
case at bar. The following logical chain will illustrate this analogy: 
a. Rights do not vest until all conditions precedent are met. 
b. One of the conditions precedent is seven (7) years of possession or use. 
c. New Escalante did not meet this condition. 
d. Therefore, its rights did not vest. 
e. Conclusion: 
i. Non-vested rights have no value and can be modified at will by legislative 
enactment, 
ii. There was such a legislative enactment, 
iii. New Escalante's rights were deleted by the legislative enactment. 
The problem with this logical chain lies in the connection between steps d and e. I will 
describe the problem that I see. 
M E M O R A N D U M DECISION ON M.OTIONS FOR S U M M A K * ILiDGMENT, Case number 
01060014, P a g e - 1 1 - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
In Utah Public Employees, the Supreme Court was faced with ambiguous statutes, P30 
tl :ii 01 igl I I > 36; alsc: at: 216 8. It cl lose to resoh e tl le ambigi lit ) "IT; ei igaging ii: i ai i ai lalysis based c i i 
contract-law-related principles. I'd P39; also at 219. That particular analytical method served the 
Si iprei i te Coi; in t: \ 211 ii 1 the cir 1:1 11 nstances of tl: lat case. 1 1 :ie cii ci n 1 istai ices 'were ai: :i e :i 1 iplo> er-
employee dispute. The Supreme Court found ooniraci-law principles to be useful m resoivim? 
tl" dispute. 1 1 i.e Suprei 1 ic Com 
However , I see a problem in extending the contract-law-based principles to the facts of 
* * . . • ; : S 
utilized b^ 'in '-/'/- ruhr- Employees court This case is not ah-MU employer-employee 
1 , ncludc thai the icasoninp oi die ' ;*• ' thhc hmplovres decision is not helpful in 
resol \ :ii ig tl le legal issues 1 aised by tl :ie Defei idai it" s Motion foi Si 11 1 a: iiai 5 Ii idgn lent. 11 1: 11 1st 
consider other appellate opinions for guidance. 
as against everyone else u-* e, p: ;he r it : -A -iei \ even if an adv ••: ,c possessor is still m iru 
process of satisfy ing tl: ic statutoi ;; pet iod. I "Il lis proi 101 1:1 icei 1 iei it '1 as n ia.de ii 1 tl le 201 itext af 
discussing the interplay between the five-year forfeiture statute and the seven-year adverse 
possessioi 1 stati lie. I he H ?/ ' s vii ', |l" :  • ::::oi 11 t: sa id tl: ic fc llov '"ing:: • ' 
However , we held that as between the prior owner and the 
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adverser, the adverser could after seven years of open, notorious 
etc., possession, have his title quieted as against the prior owner. 
Hence, we must have held that the adverser got something. If after 
five years of nonuse title reverted to the public, neither the adverse 
nor the prior owner would have any title. At 638-9. (Emphasis 
added.) 
The most unequivocal statement about the effect of the 1939 amendment has been made 
in Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 5 P.3d 1206 (Utah 2000). In footnote 19, the 
Supreme Court explained that "following an amendment of Utah's Water Code in 1939, adverse 
use that began before 1939 could still ripen into title after the effective date of the Act." Id. at 
1221. The Supreme Court cites to Mitchell v. Spanish Fork West FieldIrr. Co., 265 P.2d 1016, 
1019 (Utah 1954) and Wellsville at 460-66 in support of this statement. 
Plaintiff argues that footnote 19 is dicta, and that it relied on cases that did not 
specifically hold that the adverse possession right was allowed to ripen if it had been initiated 
before 1939. 
Footnote 19 is dicta because the Supreme Court in Silver Fork was not deciding the 
question of ripening rights. However, the pronouncement may be helpful in trying to predict how 
the Supreme Court would rule on the issue which is before this Court. 
Footnote 19 is connected to the text in P46 (paragraph 46, also at 1221) of the opinion. I 
find it interesting and instructive that the following language is found in the very next paragraph, 
P47 (also at 1222): 
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P47 . . . SFPC failed to prove seven years of continuous, 
uninterrupted, hostile, notorious, and adverse enjoyment under 
claim of title, beginning prior to 1939, by any party it may 
legitimately claim as its predecessor-in-interest. (Emphasis added.) 
There is an inference to be drawn from this language. The inference is that proof of the requisite 
possession beginning prior to 1939 could qualify as one of the elements of adverse possession. 
Besides, the Supreme Court's reliance on Mitchell and Wellsville is not misplaced. For 
example, in Mitchell, it was held that since 1939 uthe initiation of water rights by this method 
[i.e., adverse possession] has been precluded by statute." At 1019. Thus, it follows that a right 
initiated before 1939 could still ripen into adverse possession claim after 1939. 
The pronouncements in the Wellsville case that support this position have been quoted 
and analyzed above. 
Therefore, the Court finds that the Defendant's right initiated in December of 1936 may 
still ripen into a full adverse possession claim, provided the Defendant's use meets other 
necessaiy elements. 
4. Elements of Adverse Possession 
To establish the right to use water by adverse possession, the Defendant must show that 
its use has been continuous, uninterrupted, hostile, notorious, and under claim of right for the 
period of seven years. See Wellsville at 279; Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp. at 1221. 
Defendant submitted the following affidavits to establish the above elements: (1) 
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Affidavit of Melvin Alvey; (2) Affidavit of Neal Liston; (3) Affidavit of Usher L. Spencer; (4) 
Affidavit of Gail C. Bailey; and (5) Affidavit of Doyle S. Cottam. 
Plaintiff countered with a Motion to Strike those affidavits based on lack of foundation 
and lack of competency. Specific challenges to the affidavits are as follows: 
1. that the affiants born after 1900 testified about facts that occurred in 1875; 
2. that the evidence supplied refers to the time period from 1910 to 1930, which is 
not relevant; and 
3. that the statements concerning the time period from 1930 to 1940 are 
generalizations. 
The elements of adverse possession must have been satisfied by the Defendant during the 
period of 1936 until 1943. Statements concerning adverse use at any other time prior to 1936 or 
after 1943 are immaterial. 
* The Affidavit of Melvin Alvey contains one statement in paragraph number 7 concerning 
the relevant time period. It reads: "Since the early 1930's, maintenance on the Ditch has been 
performed with mechanized equipment. The Irrigation Company would hire a backhoe or 
caterpillar out of Panguitch or Salina to rebuild the ditch, whenever it became necessary." 
I think this statement contains specific information based on personal knowledge of the affiant, 
who was an active participant in the affairs of the New Escalante Irrigation Company4. This 
4
 Paragraph 1 of the Affidavit of Melvin Alvey reads: 'The following is my statement concerning 
what is referred to as the "Iron Springs Ditch" . . and I attest that the knowledge 1 have attained 
regarding the existence, purpose and use of the Ditch has been accumulated through . . my 
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statement is permitted to stand-
All other affidavits contain no relevant information about the existence and exploitation 
of the Ditch from 1936 until 1943. The other affidavits will not be considered. 
Thus, the presented evidence is insufficient to prove every element of adverse possession 
claim. The Defendant's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment on adverse possession claim 
should be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
The Iron Spring source was properly included in the Richlands litigation. The Defendant 
received sufficient notice, made no claim, and received no rights in the Iron Spring source. The 
Defendant started adversely possessing the Iron Spring water in 1936. The 1939 amendment to 
the statute does not preclude the Defendant's adverse possession claim. The Defendant did not 
produce sufficient evidence to establish all the necessary elements of adverse possession for the 
purposes of summary judgment. 
Therefore, the Plaintiffs Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment is granted on the 
following issues: (1) that the Defendant was made a party and bound by the general adjudication 
of the Sevier River in the Richlands case; and (2) that the Iron Spring source was properly 
included in the Richlands adjudication. The Plaintiffs Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment 
numerous years of experience in Lhc mailers of ihc New Escalanlc Irrigation Company . . . as a 
Board Member for 43 years, President of lhc company for 25 years, 10 years as Water Master of 
said company, and 15 years as Commissioner of Alvcy Wash." 
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is denied on the issue that the Defendant has no claim to the Iron Spring source. 
The Defendant's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment is denied on the following issues: 
(1) that the Defendant acquired diligence rights to the water diverted from the Iron Spring Draw 
area; and (2) that the Cox Decree did not adjudicate those rights. The Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment is partially denied on the issue of New Escalante's reacquiring rights to Iron 
Spring water by open, notorious, and adverse use beginning the day after entry of the Cox 
Decree because the Defendant did not produce sufficient evidence of that. The Motion is 
partially granted on this issue because the Defendant is permitted to assert its claim of adverse 
possession and establish the requisite elements at trial HpiX/id L 
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